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APPLICATION OF "MINIMUM CONTACTS" TEST TO
DISTRIBUTORSHIP RELATIONS
Grobark v. Addo Machine Company
158 N.E.2d 73, 16 Iii. 2d 426 (1959)
An Illinois adding machine distributor sued a New York corporate
manufacturer for breach of an exclusive distributorship agreement. De-
fendant did not maintain any physical contact with plaintiff within Illinois,
and the sales, at discount rates, were consummated upon acceptance of
plaintiff's orders in New York. The defendant was held not to be transacting
any business within the provisions of the Illinois service of process statute,
by virtue of the distributor relationship, and summons was quashed.
The problem of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation has
plagued the courts for many years. To derive the benefit and protection of
a state during operations therein, the enterpriser should be willing to submit
to the jurisdiction of the protecting state. The earliest cases made acquisi-
tion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation a difficult, if not impossible,
task.1 Inroads were made into this rigid position 2 with the theory that
"doing business" within the forum made the foreign corporation "present,"
and thus available for service of process.3
It was in this setting of fictional "consent" and "presence" that the
modern test was expounded that due process required only certain "mini-
mum contacts" to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam.4 This
decision has been reaffirmed many times since its pronouncement. 5 Illinois,
as do many other states,6 has a jurisdictional statute covering foreign cor-
1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839).
2 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
3 See, e.g. Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923);
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Philadelphia & Read-
ing R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 579 (1914); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1897); Cooper Mfg. Co.
v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727 (1885); Wells, F. & Co. v. McArthur Bros. Mercantile Co., 42
Ariz. 405, 26 P.2d 1021 (1933), Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1004 (1929); Metal Door & Trim Co.
v. Hunt, 170 Okla. 240, 39 P.2d 72 (1934) ; Restatement, Conffict of Laws § 167 (1934);
23 Am. Jur. "Foreign Corporations" § 361 (Supp. 1959).
4 International Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
5 See e.g. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1951), rehearing
denied 343 U.S. 917 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950);
Becher v. General Motors Corp., 167 F. Supp. 164 (Md. 1958); Brandeis Mach. & Supply
Co. v. Matewan Alma Fuel Corp., 147 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
1 See e.g. Ala. Code, tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1953); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-30
(1947); Fla. Stat. Ann., §§ 47, 16 (1943); Md. Ann. Code, art. 23, § 88(d) (1951);
Miss. Code Ann., § 1437 (1942); Ohio Rev. Code, §§ 1703.19, 1703.91 (1953); Utah
R. Civ. P., 4(e) (4), [9] Utah Code Ann., § 460 (1953).
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porations7 which authorizes in personam jurisdiction on personal service
outside of the state in enumerated circumstances.
8
The Court in the instant case appears to have construed the statute as
reflecting a conscious purpose of the legislature to assert jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant to the extent permitted by the due process clause.9
Therefore, the final determination was actually based on a federal question,
i.e., does the constitutional limitation, due process, prohibit in personam
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant on the basis of a distributor rela-
tionship?
Generally, "doing business," or a similar phrase, is the language of
states' jurisdiction statutes to determine if a foreign corporation is subjected
to in personam jurisdiction, but "minimum contacts" is the due process test
of such a statute.-' The constitutional test is to apply the language to see if
the statutory test affords enough "minimum contacts" so that the main-
tenance of the action does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. In the ideal situation the facts which bring the corpora-
tion within the purview of the state statute will also satisfy the due process
standard." The range of "contacts" that have been held sufficient to subject
a foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction are as wide and varied as
are the enterprises of the nation.12
7 Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1955).
8 Ibid., § 17(1) ... "Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits said person, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from doing of any said acts.
(a) The transaction of any business within the State; . ..."
9 Nelson v. Miller, 11 I1. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Haas v. Fanchler Furni-
ture Company, 156 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Ill. 1957); Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249
F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957) (employment of an engineer and lawyer not transaction of
business); but see Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 28 U.S.L.W. 2182 (7th Cir.
1959) (mailing catalogues in Illinois not transacting business).
10 See 23 Am. Jur. "Foreign Corporations" § 490 (Supp. 1959).
11 Supra note 3; Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); Minty
v. Draper & Co., 57 F.2d 551 (1932); McClarran v. Longdin-Brugger Co., 24 Ohio App.
437, 157 N.E. 828 (1927); Wills v. Natl Mineral Co., 176 Okla. 193, 55 P.2d 449 (1936).
12 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (mailing of reinsurance certifi-
cates to person in Calif. and acceptance of premiums from out of state held enough
contact to subject company to Calif. jurisdiction); WSAZ Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242
(6th Cir. 1958) (broadcasting company broadcasting to another state per an advertising
contract held sufficient contact); Erlanger Mills Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills Inc., 239
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (single transaction by foreign corporation in state of forum
not enough for minimum contact); Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 229
F.2d 158 (2nd Cir. 1956) (individual carrying company's policy into new state presents
enough contact) ; see Scholink v. National Airline, 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955) (flying
leased plane over area with no office and no schedule flights presents enough contact);
Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); Ultra Sucro Co. v.
Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (sales office presided over
by a salesman presents enough contact); Compania De Astral, SA. v. Boston Metals
Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 943 (1955) (Panamanian
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The majority in the instant case cites Hanson v. Denckla to support its
conclusion. The United States Supreme Court in that case merely made the
general observation that there are still some restrictions on in personam
jurisdiction, and that the phrase "minimum contacts" certainly does not
include "no contacts ." 3
The dissent suggests that the majority may have relied on a narrow
interpretation of "transaction of any business," and, perhaps had over-
looked "contacts" with the forum that would bring the corporation within
the bounds of the Illinois statute and still meet the due process standard.
The dissent concluded that the corporation did "transact" business within
the state because of close, continuous contact with the Illinois distributor,
and because of commitments which were to be performed almost solely in
Illinois. The essence of the dissent's approach is characterized in its state-
ment that "it is the business relationship ... which constitutes the qualify-
ing contact with the forum ... ."4 The dissent sees that relationship here
as the necessary contact to meet the "minimum contacts" test. The dissent
easily distinguishes Hanson v. Denckla,15 and points out that the manufac-
turer's ties with Illinois were as great as a number of other cases where
jurisdiction was upheld as to foreign corporations.' 0
However, the instant case does appear to be squarely in accord with an
earlier decision in Maryland,' 7 where, under a similar jurisdictional statute,'8
the court concluded the distributor relationship precluded extending in
personam jurisdiction.
Most of the state courts which have decided this question apparently
hold that a distributor agreement does not satisfy the "minimum contacts"
requirement,' 9 except in those situations where the manufacturer exercises
corporation with no office in U.S. held subject to jurisdiction of state on basis of single
contract); Manhattan Terrazzo Brass Co., Inc. v. A. Benzing, & Sons, 38 Ohio L. Abs.
353 (1943) (solicitation of orders enough contact); Haas v. Fanchler, supra note 9;
State v. Amazon Ins. Co., 14 Ohio C.C. Dec. 387 (1903) (office in state of service, but
making contracts of insurance for property out of state presents sufficient contacts);
7 Ala. L. Rev. 418 (1955).
13 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), at 251 "... It is a mistake to assume
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction
of state courts."
14 Grobark v. Addo Machine Company, supra at pp. 80, 81.
35 Ibid.; "That Hanson involves an entirely different problem is apparent from the
discussion of that case in the court's opinion."
16 Ibid., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., supra note 12; Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., supra note 5; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, supra note 5.
'7 Arundel Crane Serv. Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428
(1958) (goods sold by local dealer who bought at standard discount).
18 Md. Ann. Code, art. 23, § 88(a) (1951).
19 Westwood Pharmacal Corp. v. Fielding, 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Florio v. Powder
Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1957) (distributor could only sell defendant's
products, and had to maintain working capital and sales quotas as defendant deemed
proper); Republic Supply Corp. v. Lewyt Corp., 160 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mich. 1958)
(right to inspect the place of business and audit the records of distributor); J. R.
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sufficient control to render the distributor his agent. 20 The wisdom in drawing
the line at this point is open to question, particularly in light of the fact that
many federal courts have found jurisdiction where the contacts appear to be
slighter. A manufacturer who enters into a distributorship agreement with
a person in another state derives much the same benefit from that relation
as he would by marketing his products through an agent in that state. This
distinction creates a handicap for the distributor by considerably restricting
his choice of forums. Since the distributor probably could not sue in an
Illinois federal court, by virtue of the rule in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,21 he is
forced to bring his action in either the manufacturer's home state, or some
other state in which service of process can be had.
In view of the benefits which the manufacturer realizes in the state
through such an arrangement, it is difficult to see how the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction by that state can be said to offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.
Philip R. Joelson
Watkins Co. v. Stanford, 52 So.2d 325 (Ct. App. La. 1951); Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v.
Superior Court, 307 P.2d 739 (Ct. App. Cal. 1957); Dettman v. Nelson Tester Co., 95
N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1959) (sales reports required, guarantee issued in name of foreign
corporation, service centers established by foreign corporations).
20 Rock-Ola Mfg. Co. v. Wertz, 249 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1958) (manufacturer
required distributor to retain service man for repairs, showrooms, and office- facilities,
at distributor's own expense); Canvas Fabricators Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952) (Foreign corporation left bank account in forum to
pay office expenses, name on door, telephone directory, corporate letterhead used,
orders sent to foreign corporation's office); Air Devices Inc. v. Titus Mfg. Corp., 167
F. Supp. 1 (N.J. 1958) (distributor bought at discount price and resold at higher
price); Springs Cotton Mills v. Machinecraft Inc., 156 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.S.C. 1958)
(distributor sold other manufacturer's products also); Edwards v. Scott & Fetzer Inc.,
154 F. Supp. 41 (M.D.N.C. 1958) (no control over manner or method of resale by dis-
tributor); Anderson v. British Overseas Airway Corp., 144 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Clapper Motor Co. v. Robinson Motor Co., 119 F. Supp. 79 (Mont. 1954);
Superior Concrete Accessories v. Kemper, 284 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1955); Feldman v. Thew
Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957) (distributor took orders, bought equip-
ment at discount from foreign corporation, and took credit risk); Knapp v. Roberton
Mfg. Co., 155 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1957); Bargesser v. The Coleman Co., 230 S.C.
562, 96 S.E.2d 825 (1957); 20 C.J.S. "Corporations" § 1920 (Supp. 1959); 23 Am. Jur.
"Foreign Corporations" §§ 297-300 (Supp. 1959).
21 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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